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THE PHYSICIAN AS A
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
J. David Bleich*
I. ACCOMMODATION OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
Rabbinic lore relates an anecdote, probably apocryphal, portray-
ing a lively student who flits from person to person in the study
hall. To each one he says, I have an answer. Ask me a question! I
do not claim to have a resolution to the dilemma posed when a
conflict arises between a patient's rights and a physician's con-
science, certainly not a facile one. My real task is to convince those
in a position to implement a solution that a problem exists and that
it merits serious consideration. Patient autonomy certainly de-
serves both moral respect and legal protection, but to demand of a
physician that she act in a manner she deems to be morally un-
palatable not only compromises the physician's ethical integrity,
but is also likely to have a corrosive effect upon the dedication and
zeal with which she ministers to patients.
Society has long recognized and been forced to come to grips
with the conflict arising from a woman's right to terminate a preg-
nancy as announced by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade,1 and the moral convictions of a health care practitioner that
constrain her to refuse to participate in the extinguishing of nas-
cent human life. A physician's belief that certain forms of assisted
reproduction constitute a violation of natural law does not impact
an infertile couple's right of procreation for the simple reason that
a physician who espouses such views will choose another area of
specialization. Yet, the issue of whether an employer who finds
such forms of procreation to be morally offensive that must never-
theless include coverage of such forms of fertility treatment in
health care insurance provided to employees represents an un-
resolved moral dilemma as evidenced by a recent debate in the
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; Tenzer Professor of
Jewish Law and Ethics, Yeshiva University; Professor of Talmud and Director of Post-
graduate Institute for Jurisprudence and Family Law, Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theologi-
cal Seminary; Herbert and Florence Tenzer Professor of Jewish Law and Ethics,
Yeshiva University.
1. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
New York legislature.2 Finally, the courts in Tarasoff v. Regents of
the University of California3 and its progeny have long since recog-
nized and addressed the issue of maintaining professional confi-
dentiality in the face of imminent criminal activity.
II. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION VS. PATIENT AUTONOMY
There remain two areas in which conflicts do exist, but are
largely ignored. First, is the treatment of the terminally ill, in both
the broad sense of the term and the more narrow sense, the deter-
mination of the time of death at which continued treatment is re-
garded as inappropriate. The second is in the field of neonatology
with regard to the institution of measures designed to assure the
survival of an unborn infant suffering from a serious congenital
anomaly. Contemporary society has long conscientiously sub-
scribed to the tongue-in-cheek adage formulated by Arthur
Clough: "Thou shalt not kill; but needs't not strive officiously to
keep alive. ' '4 However, there are individuals who sincerely believe
that the preservation of life is a paramount value, and that the
quality of life preserved is irrelevant to fulfillment of the moral
imperative generated by that value. For these individuals, failure
to provide aggressive treatment for even the most premature neo-
nate, for instance the infant afflicted with spina bifida,5 or a severe
chromosomal defect,6 is the moral equivalent of infanticide. Like-
wise, failure to intubate7 a terminally comatose patient, or even to
2. S. 936, 224th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S. 7359, 225th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y.
2002) (discussing acts to amend the insurance and health law in relation to health
insurance and conscience clauses).
3. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (holding
that therapist's special relationship to patient also applied to plaintiff, and that thera-
pist had a duty to exercise reasonable care when he was aware that patient was going
to harm victim).
4. Arthur Hugh Clough, The Latest Decalogue, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH VERSE 205 (3d ed. 1974). These words, when quoted, are
almost invariably cited in a literal sense. In actuality, the poet was not endorsing the
moral position expressed in this couplet, but was engaging in irony. See MAURICE
BENJAMIN STRAUSS, FAMILIAR MEDICAL QUOTATIONS 159b n.1 (1968).
5. Spina bifida is a condition, which results from defective development of the
posterior wall of the spinal canal (neural arches) causing one or more vertebrae to
remain incomplete. THE OXFORD MEDICAL COMPANION 918 (John Nicholas Walton
et al. eds., 1994).
6. A chromosome is a thread-shaped structure consisting largely of deox-
yribonucleic acid ("DNA") and protein. Id. at 138.
7. Intubation is the introduction and maintenance of a tube within part of the
body, particularly an endo-tracheal tube to maintain an airway for artificial ventila-
tion and administration of general anesthesia. Id. at 435.
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administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation,8 when there is a realistic
possibility of clinical success, constitutes passive euthanasia. These
individuals would also consider employment of neurological crite-
ria in pronouncing death nothing but a deceptive subterfuge de-
signed to disguise an immoral act by means of semantic sleight of
hand.
There have been a number of instances where hospitals have de-
clined to honor a request for discontinuance of a feeding tube and
other life supporting technology. 9 However, such occurrences have
been few and far between and have involved matters of institu-
tional policy rather than an expression of the qualms of an individ-
ual physician or nurse. Solo practitioners are also confronted with
this dilemma. A solo practitioner's isolation aggravates her di-
lemma because she must make a principled decision without the
moral support of like-minded colleagues, and without the benefit
of institutional legal talent or informational resources.
The first difficulty in generating awareness of the problem appar-
ently lies in the relatively small number of health care practitioners
who find themselves morally conflicted. The problems of the few
seldom become the concern of the many. A more serious hurdle
lies in the unwillingness of many medical institutions, as well as
society, to recognize the existence of a genuine moral dilemma.
Law and morality occupy quite different arenas; nevertheless,
law frequently gives expression to the moral values of society. Os-
tensibly, the decision handed down in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith was designed to
establish the parameters of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.' 0 Smith establishes the principle that only religious
worship enjoys absolute constitutional protection.'1 According to
Smith, religious conduct does not enjoy any particular constitu-
tional protection so long as the religious practice is not singled out
in a discriminating fashion. 2 The result of this principle is that,
even in the absence of a compelling state interest, statutes of gen-
8. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") is the "restoration of cardiac output
and pulmonary ventilation following cardiac arrest and apnea, using artificial respira-
tion and manual closed chest compression or open chest cardiac massage."
STEDMAN'S CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 760
(John. H. Dirckx, M.D. ed., 3d ed. 1997).
9. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268 (1990) (deny-
ing a court order for a third party to force a hospital to remove a patient's feeding
tube and hydration equipment).
10. Emp. Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
11. Id. at 877-78.
12. Id.
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eral applicability can be enforced against an individual even when
conformity with the law compels compromise of religious
scruples.13 Prior to Smith, religious practice was accorded defer-
ence on constitutional grounds so long as there was no counter-
vailing compelling state interest. 4 The volte face in constitutional
law represented by Smith can only be explained by changing socie-
tal attitudes vis-A-vis religion in general and religious practice in
particular.
While continuing to pay at least lip service to the role of religion
in society, society simply does not take religion and religious
scruples as seriously as it did in days gone by. The prevailing no-
tion seems to be that religious preferences are precisely that,
namely, preferences, but not mandates. Thus, just as recreational,
aesthetic, or gastronomical preferences must bow to laws of gen-
eral applicability, it is assumed that religious preferences must bow
to the demands of the dominant culture that are enshrined in
statute.
Such a socio-political stance not only fails to respect the role of
religion in the life and value system of the religionist, but also fails
to recognize the historical and pragmatic basis from which the prin-
ciple of religious freedom developed. Indeed, although often over-
looked, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 5 was
rooted, at least in part, on practical considerations.
The Framers of the Constitution of the United States made ex-
tensive use of the writings of John Locke, whose influence was
most direct upon the First Amendment.16 Locke recognized that
religious intolerance was inconsistent with both public peace and
good government, and deemed religious rivalry and intolerance to
be among the most severe political problems of his day.'" Civil
strife and lawlessness, not to speak of war between nations, were
regarded by Locke as the product of religious turmoil. 8 In an es-
say written in 1689, Locke stated:
It is not the diversity of opinions, which cannot be avoided; but
the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions,
13. Id. at 889.
14. Id. at 883; see also Scherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (holding
that the conditions used for unemployment benefits infringed on the party's free exer-
cise of religion).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Ex-
ercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1430-31 n.7 (1990).
17. Id. at 1431.
18. Id.
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which might have been granted, that has produced all the
bustles and wars, that have been in the Christian world, upon
account of religion.' 9
Elsewhere, decrying the futility of religious coercion, Locke
wrote, "let divines preach duty as long as they will, 'twas never
known that men lay down quietly under the oppression and sub-
mitted their backs to the blows of others, when they thought they
had strength enough to defend themselves. 20
The way to avoid such strife is by assuring toleration and liberty
of religious practice for all. Freedom of religious practice also en-
ables a government to govern effectively. A populace that per-
ceives its religious principles to be thwarted by the government will
harbor deep resentment and disrespect for the ruling authority.
Consequently, the government will be delegitimized in the eyes of
those whose religious liberties are denied, thereby compromising
respect for the government and its laws. Such considerations apply
to matters of religious practice no less so than to matters of belief
and worship.
There has been at least one case where a physician has testified
that he would feel morally compelled to disobey a court order that
would result in hastening the death of a patient.2 In Grace Plaza
of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, Dr. Lester Corn, the medical direc-
tor of Grace Plaza, testified that he would not remove artificial nu-
trition or hydration from a patient, even under court order.2 Dr.
Corn testified that not only would he refuse to disconnect the pa-
tient from a feeding tube, but also that he would not allow access
for that purpose to a physician not connected with Grace Plaza. 3
Dr. Corn apparently adopted that stance, not on the basis of relig-
ious conviction, but because of his perception of the ethical com-
mitment of a medical practitioner 4.2  Dr. Corn "further testified
that he would not disconnect a patient from a feeding tube because
19. Id. at 1432 (quoting VI JOHN LOCKE, Letters on Toleration, in THE WORKS OF
JOHN LOCKE 53 (Scientia Verlag 1963) (1823)).
20. See I H.R. Fox BOURNE, THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 190 (1876).
21. See generally Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App.
1983). See also George J. Annas, When Suicide Prevention Becomes Brutality: The
Case of Elizabeth Bouvia, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20, 20 (1984). Although not
cited in the decision, Dr. Donald E. Fish, chief of psychiatry at Riverside County
General Hospital, "testified that he would have force-fed the patient with a nasogas-
tric tube even if the court ordered him not to." Id.
22. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 859 (App. Div.
1992).
23. Id. at 863.
24. Id. at 858.
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to do so would be condemning the patient 'to death, which is in
essence contrary to the dedication of medicine [to] the preserva-
tion of life and not the discontinuance of life."' 25 A physician who
internalizes such values because of an objective to fulfill the divine
mandate, "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow, 26
rather than based on a subjective perception of the ethical commit-
ment of a medical practitioner, can hardly be expected to be less
tenacious.
Civil disobedience, if tolerated, can rapidly degenerate into anar-
chy. Yet, even upon taking note of that concern as a moral consid-
eration, a person of abiding religious conviction may find that her
conscience demands that she disregard the fiat of a secular state
when she finds it to be in conflict with divine law. Locke saga-
ciously recognized that when such a conflict arises the state is inevi-
tably the loser, regardless of how the conflict is resolved.2 7 Civil
disobedience, even in the name of religion, undermines respect for
the law; coerced obedience to laws deemed to be repugnant to re-
ligious scruples breeds disdain for the state and its institutions.
Locke's solution was to prevent such conflicts from arising in the
first place. 28 The authors of the First Amendment were prompted
by the recognition that strategic retreat in the face of a religious
claim redounds to the interest of the state, at least in the absence of
a countervailing state interest.
III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND
PRESERVATION OF LIFE
Both the religionist and the secular humanist regard individual
autonomy and preservation of life as moral values. The problem
occurs when the two come into conflict, i.e., when one cannot pre-
serve one value other than by compromising another. When this
conflict exists, it is not the case that the secular humanist always
gives preference to individual autonomy over preservation of life.
No one has argued that either consensual homicide or dueling is, or
ought to be, constitutionally protected. At least to that extent, so-
ciety recognizes the state's paramount interest in restraining con-
duct designed to compromise the value of human life even at the
cost of curtailing individual liberty.
25. Id. at 863.
26. Leviticus 19:16.
27. McConnell, supra note 16, at 1496-97 n.7.
28. Id. at 1445.
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Indeed, recent debate concerning a constitutional right to sui-
cide, with or without physician assistance, has been limited to sui-
cide on the part of the terminally ill or the seriously debilitated.
The plaintiffs in Washington v. Glucksberg did not claim an un-
trammeled right to commit suicide, much less to assistance in doing
so.29 In a previous suit against the state of Washington, the plain-
tiffs asserted their right to "the existence of a liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a personal
choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit phy-
sician-assisted suicide."30 In arguing that "the constitutional princi-
pal behind recognizing the patient's liberty to direct the withdrawal
of artificial life support applies at least as strongly to the choice of
impending death by consuming lethal medication,"'" the plaintiffs
narrowed the issue to the determination of whether such rights
could be advanced by a terminally ill patient. The district court
and the court of appeals, relying on Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,3 2 took the same position when "de-
termining 'what liberty interest may inhere in a terminally ill
person's choice to commit suicide."' 33
Despite an early decision in John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital
v. Heston, it is now well-established that even an otherwise healthy
competent adult has the right to refuse medical intervention, even
in life-threatening situations.34 In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that this right is based upon the consti-
tutionally protected right to privacy, as well as the common law
right to bodily integrity.35 Later, in In re Conroy, the court relied
upon the common law right of self-determination.36 Although
Quinlan's emphasis on the constitutional privilege has been criti-
cized by Justice Handler in In re Jobes,37 as well as by Professor
Lawrence Tribe,38 the existence of both a constitutional and a com-
29. Wash. v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1997).
30. Compassion in Dying v. State, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(emphasis added).
31. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added).
32. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
33. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added).
34. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (N.J. 1971), over-
ruled by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985).
35. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976).
36. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1222-23.
37. 529 A.2d 434, 454 n.3 (N.J. 1987) ("The Quinlan court may have been mis-
taken in its choice to base the decision on constitutional grounds.").
38. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-11, at 937
(1978).
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mon law basis for such a right has been acknowledged in numerous
cases.
39
Less clear, and certainly debatable, is whether a healthy adult of
clear mind has a constitutional right to passively commit suicide by
refusing food and water.4° The issue with regard to passive suicide
is whether the state's interest in preventing the death of one of its
healthy citizens trumps not only the would-be suicide's liberty in-
terest, but also her right to bodily integrity. Although the courts
consider the insertion and even the continued use of a feeding tube
to be a medical procedure, which as such, may be refused by any
person, they nevertheless appear to be willing to countenance such
intervention in the face of refusal of food and water that might be
ingested in a normal manner.41 The court's statement in Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz implies that the
distinction between declining life sustaining medical treatment may
not properly be viewed as an attempt to commit suicide.4 2 Refus-
ing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natu-
ral course.43 Even more explicit is Chief Justice Rehnquist's
emphatic statement in Cruzan: "We do not think a state is required
to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision
by a physically able adult to starve to death. 44
It should then be hardly surprising that some members of society
subscribe to a value system in which preservation of life is accorded
39. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (hold-
ing that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted medical treatment); Foody v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 482 A.2d 713,
717-18 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (acknowledging that "[a]part from constitutional con-
siderations, the individual right to self-determination has long been recognized at
common law," and, "includes the right of a competent adult to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment." (citations omitted)).
40. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that patient who was mentally competent had a fundamental
right to refuse such treatment). For a summary and analysis of that case, see Annas,
supra note 21, at 20-21, 46.
41. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 ( finding that "forced administration of life-sustaining
medical treatment, and even of artificially delivered food and water essential to life,
would implicate a competent person's liberty interest.").
42. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423
(Mass. 1977).
43. Id.
44. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. Earlier, in Heston, albeit in the context of a decision
denying the patient's right to refuse certain forms of intervention, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in addressing the distinction between passively submitting to death
and actively seeking it, declared, "[t]he distinction may be merely verbal, as it would
be if an adult sought death by starvation instead of a drug. If the State may interrupt
one mode of self-destruction, it may with equal authority interfere with the others."
John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 672-73 (N.J. 1971).
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virtually unqualified supremacy over other values. The problem is
further compounded when the health care practitioner asserts not
only that she regards preservation of life to be a more compelling
interest than preservation of patient autonomy, but also advances
her own liberty interest in the form of a claim to free exercise of
religion.
It might be thought that one person's liberty interest, including
the right to free exercise of religion, ends when it impinges upon
the liberty interest of another. This notion is particularly compel-
ling when that liberty interest is not only grounded in a common
law right to be free from any unwanted intrusion, but also in an
equally protected constitutional right of privacy. Nevertheless, in
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court ordered artificial maintenance of nutrition and hydra-
tion to be discontinued, and held that a medical facility must honor
the substituted judgment of a patient in a persistent vegetative
state.45 However, the court also held that the medical facility treat-
ing the patient was fully entitled to remain loyal to its own moral
convictions that constrained it from honoring the patient's
wishes.46 The remedy offered by the court was to authorize the
patient's guardian to remove the patient from that hospital to the
care of other physicians who were prepared to honor the patient's
wishes.47 Citing earlier cases where "maintenance of the ethical
integrity of the medical profession" was recognized over a counter-
vailing state interest,48 the court agreed that the hospital and the
medical staff "should not be compelled to withhold food and water
to a patient, contrary to its moral and ethical principles, when such
principles are recognized and accepted within a significant segment
45. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986).
46. Id. at 639.
47. Id. at 640.
48. The earliest formulation of this consideration of a compelling state interest is
in Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425. See also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-24 (N.J.
1985) (noting the state's interest in the preservation of life). In Quinlan, the court
referred to the claimed interest of the state in the "defense of the right of the physi-
cian to administer medical treatment according to his best judgment." In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976). That concept may or may not be identical with the
concept of the ethical integrity of the medical profession Id. at 668-69. In Quinlan,
the court, in effect, rejected that argument by substituting its own judgment regarding
a proper medical response for that of the physician who did not wish to remove the
respirator. Id. at 665-67. It would have been more forthright for the court to have
declared that the state has no interest in preserving a physician's autonomous judg-
ment with regard to proper practice of medicine. Id. at 668. In any event, the court
treated "the right of the physician" as being predicated upon medical practice rather
than upon ethical principles. Id. at 668-69.
253
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of the medical profession and the hospital community. '49 At the
same time, the court found that so long as the hospital was itself
not forced to participate in removing the gastrostomy tube,.there
was no violation of the integrity of the medical profession5
°
However, it should not be assumed that the Brophy court estab-
lished a clear hierarchy of values in which the need to maintain the
integrity of the medical profession serves to establish the primacy
of the individual physician's ethical sensitivity. The court pointed
to the existence of "substantial disagreement in the medical com-
munity" with regard to the propriety of withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration as well as to the hospital's willingness to assist in a trans-
fer of the patient to another facility where the desired effect could
be achieved. 1 The court emphasized that "[it] would be particu-
larly inappropriate to force the hospital, which is willing to assist in
a transfer of the patient, to take affirmative steps to end the provi-
sion of nutrition and hydration to him."'5 2 Apparently for those
reasons, and only because of those reasons, "[a] patient's right to
refuse medical treatment does not warrant an unnecessary intru-
sion upon the hospital's ethical integrity in this case.53
Less than a fortnight later, in In re Requena, a New Jersey court
ruled that the right of a patient dying of amyotrophic lateral sclero-
sis to refuse feeding by nasogastric tube had priority over the hos-
pital's policy against participating in the withholding of food or
fluids from the patient.5 4 The court ordered St. Clare's/Riverside
Medical Center to remove the patient's feeding tube despite the
Medical Center's willingness, and even demand, to transfer the pa-
tient to St. Barnabas Hospital for that purpose.55 Nevertheless, the
court conceded the Medical Center's proposal to be "a realistic al-
ternative, 56 and indeed an expedient one that "would seem to be
an ideal solution to the problem presented by this case." 57
Requena is distinguishable from, and hence consistent with,
Brophy by virtue of the fact that Beverly Requena was conscious
of her surroundings, while Patricia Brophy was in a permanent veg-
49. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639.
50. Id. at 638.
51. Id. at 639.
52. Id.; see also Childs v. Abramovice, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Ct. App.) (finding
that no further right may be asserted when medical facility is willing to effect a
transfer).
53. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 639 (emphasis added).
54. In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
55. Id. at 890.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 889.
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etative state.58 This distinction is significant because the Requena
court declined to honor St. Clare's demand of transfer despite the
fact that Beverly Requena's physician was also a member of the St.
Barnabas' staff; that, as the court acknowledged, the facilities and
treatment skills available at St. Barnabas were equal to those of St.
Clare; and that the transfer to St. Barnabas located in the same
geographical area could be safely and easily accomplished.5 9
Rather, the court based its decision on its finding that it would be
"emotionally and psychologically upsetting ' 60 for the patient to be
forced to leave the facility in which she was being treated, and that
her removal "would also have significant elements of rejection and
casting out, which would be burdensome for Ms. Requena. "61
Nevertheless, it would be extremely naive to assume that these
two decisions do not fundamentally disagree. One can accept the
assertion of the presence of an emotional and psychological burden
at face value, and still question how such a burden borne for a
short time could overcome and negate a state interest in maintain-
ing the integrity of the medical profession. Quite clearly, the Re-
quena court recognized no such state interest; indeed, it did not
deign to acknowledge that other courts have recognized such an
interest. Hence, absent acknowledgment of such an interest, the
court should not have had mixed feelings in reaching its decision.
Every moment that a court allows a feeding tube to remain in place
represents a bodily intrusion and the invasion of a constitutionally
protected right to privacy, as earlier defined by the United States
Supreme Court in Cruzan.62 Accordingly, the court should have
forthwith issued an order directing removal of the feeding tube.
Although the court did not label it as such, St. Clare's hospital
asserted that preservation of the medical facility's ethical integrity
was a matter of constitutional concern.63 The Hospital spoke of
"the wrongness of denying food or water to a patient, 64 and of
"the need for all patients and potential patients of the Hospital to
be absolutely assured that they would not be harmed by the Hospi-
tal or any of its personnel while undergoing care."' 65 That assertion
was contemptuously rejected by the court with the rejoinder that
58. Compare id., with Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 627.
59. Requena, 517 A.2d at 889.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
63. Requena, 517 A.2d at 892.
64. Id. at 891.
65. Id.
255
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honoring the patient's request "is not denying her anything," and
that, "[p]roperly understood it has no adverse implication for gen-
eral patient care or for public confidence in the Hospital and its
staff."
66
The issue requiring clarification is the meaning of the "mainte-
nance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession ' '67 as consti-
tuting a state interest sufficiently compelling to overcome a
patient's right of privacy. The Brophy court found that asserting a
claim of an obligation to treat a patient gives rise to a state interest
in supporting that claim despite "substantial disagreement" among
members of the profession with regard to the existence of such a
claim under that case's circumstances.68 In Brophy, the interest is
treated as an ethical consideration in the classic sense of the term,
i.e., as an assertion of a value, and hence a matter that might be
individual or subjective in nature.69 The Saikewicz court, which
first enumerated "maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession" as one of four "countervailing state interests" that
might serve to negate a right to refuse medical treatment, appar-
ently took a diametrically opposed position.70 That court catego-
rized the "force and impact" of the state's interest in the
maintenance of the profession's ethical integrity as "lessened by
the prevailing medical ethical standards."'7' Accordingly, since
"[r]ecognition of the right to refuse necessary treatment in appro-
priate circumstances is consistent with existing mores,' 72 it follows
that in withholding such measures there is no threat to the integrity
of the medical profession. As stated by the Saikewicz court, a state
interest lies only in supporting a practitioner's judgment that is "in
accord with the generally accepted views of the medical profes-
sion. '73 Thus, the expressed interest appears to be preservation of
the integrity of medical practice, rather than of the ethics of the
profession. However, if that statement is understood as meaning
that the state's interest does indeed lie in maintaining ethical integ-
rity, it is nevertheless clear that the Saikewicz court would limit
66. Id. at 892 (emphasis added).
67. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986).
68. Id. at 639.
69. Id. (arguing that the state should not force medical professionals to take active
measures "contrary to their view of their ethical duty toward their patients.").
70. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977).
71. Id. at 426,
72. Id.
73. Id. at 427.
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that interest to preservation of only those ethical judgments that
garner a consensus of medical opinion.
It is remarkable that both the Brophy and the Saikewicz courts
(assuming that the Saikewicz court was also concerned with ethical
integrity) focus upon the ethical integrity of the medical profession
rather than of the practitioner. Both courts were willing to allow
the medical profession's own practice ipso facto to serve as the
standard for establishing an ethical norm. Such deference to the
medical profession is misplaced. Physicians are not and should not
be required, or even permitted, to become arbiters of ethical stan-
dards. Physicians, by virtue of training and experience, are ac-
knowledged experts in medical science and clinical practice; they
are also uniquely qualified to determine the prognosis of a malady
and to assess the efficiency of alternative therapies. However,
there is nothing in their training or experience that qualifies them
as ethicists. As an individual, the physician's ethical values are en-
titled to the same respect as any other citizen, but also to no more
deference than those of any other citizen. Moreover, even the cu-
mulative value of all members of the profession is not entitled to
greater protection than that of any other aggregate of individuals.
If the "maintenance of ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion" constitutes a compelling state interest, it must be because so-
ciety has a pragmatic interest in maintaining the norms that have
historically been the hallmark of the medical profession. Society
has a need for physicians who are healers, not "thanatologists." '74
Physicians can best protect society if such conduct is in the nature
of a Pavlovian response by intuitively and instinctively seeking to
actively prolong the life of a patient. Permitting a physician to
withdraw a feeding tube-particularly when she does not wish to
do so-serves to interfere with what hopefully is an instinctive re-
flex and desensitizes the physician's compelling urge to preserve
life. St. Clare's Hospital well understood the meaning of, and the
need for, "public confidence in [its] Hospital and its staff."75 It also
had a firm grasp of the meaning of "ethical integrity of the medical
profession '' 76 as a cognizable consideration in constitutional
jurisprudence.
74. Thanatology, from the Greek word for death, is the "branch of science con-
cerned with the study of death and dying." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1793
(26th ed. 1995).
75. In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886, 892 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986).
76. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
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Requena is rather unique in that St. Clare's Hospital explicitly
presented what was, in effect, a First Amendment argument.77 A
Roman Catholic religious order of nuns controlled St. Clare's Hos-
pital who refused to accede to the withholding of artificial feeding
because such conduct would conflict with its "pro-life" values. The
court could quite well have entered into an analysis of the limita-
tions of the rights conferred by the Free Exercise Clause and, most
particularly, upon the availability of a free exercise claim in face of
a countervailing constitutionally protected right to privacy. In-
stead, it inappropriately proceeded to correct the good sisters'
"mistaken ' 78 assessment of Catholic teaching:
I suspect that part of the Hospital's insistence on what it per-
ceives as a pro-life position in this case is a mistaken fall-out
from the abortion controversy which is ongoing in our society.
The Hospital, whose values are premised as they are on the lov-
ing care of people, naturally (and, I think, properly) views abor-
tion as a terrible evil. But abortion involves the active, direct,
intentional termination of life by interfering in the processes of
nature. The life taken is usually perfectly healthy. The fetus
does not in any sense consent to what is done to it. None of
those elements are present in Mrs. Requena's case. There is no
sensible comparison to be drawn between the two situations.79
Catholic morality is for Catholic moralists, not secular courts, to
decide. Moreover, it is well-settled that not only are courts pre-
cluded from inquiring into the basis of doctrinal matters, but that
the First Amendment protection extends to matters that are erro-
neous, inconsistent, or even illogical. In Thomas v. Review Board
of the Indiana Employment Security Division, the Supreme Court
declared that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, con-
sistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amend-
ment protection."8
Neither is unanimity among Catholics a prerequisite for asser-
tion of a Free Exercise claim by a Catholic or by Catholic institu-
tion because "[i]ntrafaith differences ... are not uncommon among
followers of a particular creed ... and the guarantee of free exer-
cise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members
of a religious sect." '81
77. Requena, 517 A.2d at 892 (noting the impact of the hospital's affiliation with
the Roman Catholic Church).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
81. Id. at 715-16.
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In a concluding homily that strikes as offensive to both the letter
and spirit of the First Amendment, the court noted that the Hospi-
tal "rejoices in its specifically Christian heritage, '"82 and admon-
ishes its health care workers "to recall the beautiful words of Jesus:
'Come to me, all you who are weary and find life burdensome, and
I will refresh you."' 83 The fact that ecclesiastic officials of the or-
der responsible for the administration of St. Clare's Hospital-as
well as other scholars whose moral views are more consistent with
those of the court-would find this an egregious misinterpretation
of Scripture is irrelevant. The Devil may or may not have divine
license to quote Scripture to suit his own purpose; a judge most
assuredly does not have constitutional license to do so.
Pursuant to an accelerated appeal, the appellate division af-
firmed the lower court's decision, but apparently only on the basis
of a supplemental consideration. The appellate court declared:
An equitable consideration here is that Beverly Requena had no
notice of St. Clare's policy against withholding artificial feeding
or fluids until July of 1986. The balance to be struck here is
between the hospital's right to enforce its regulation and funda-
mental rights of the patient. Under the circumstances we find
no waiver or estoppel against Beverly Requena who had no no-
tice of the regulation prior to her admission or for 15 months
thereafter.
Viewed in this light, it is clear that Judge Stanton has not made a
legal decision invalidating the hospital regulation but rather factual
findings that have substantial support in the record, and he has bal-
anced the equities in not applying that regulation to Mrs.
Requena.4
It may certainly be argued that the appellate court chose to mis-
read Judge Stanton's decision, but, if so, the appellate court was
assisted by Judge Stanton in that misreading of his opinion. Osten-
sibly, Judge Stanton totally negated the hospital's claim and did not
at all predicate his decision upon the absence of prior notice to
Mrs. Requena.85 Nevertheless, if St. Clare could not assert a right
to continue treatment under any circumstances, there was no rea-
son for the lower court to engage in a balancing of relevant consid-
erations. Be that as it may, the appellate court's decision certainly
affirms the principle that, at least in some circumstances, i.e., upon
82. Requena, 517 A.2d at 893.
83. Id. (quoting Matthew 11:28).
84. Id. at 870.
85. Id.
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proper notice to the patient of the question of such a policy, a med-
ical facility may persist in keeping a patient alive against her
wishes.86
Some months later, the finding of the appellate division was
adopted, albeit somewhat equivocally, by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in In re Jobes.87 The issue in Jobes was similar to that
in Requena in that Nancy Jobes's husband brought suit seeking re-
moval of a life sustaining nutrition system from his comatose wife
who was a patient in a nursing home.88 Yet, unlike the situation in
Requena, there was no other readily identifiable facility that was
willing to admit the patient for that purpose.8 9 Hence, the court
ruled that the nursing home could not refuse to participate in the
withdrawal of the patient's feeding tube.90 Regardless of the deci-
sion, it is of crucial significance that the court's judgment was pred-
icated upon the absence of prior notice. This is most explicitly
illustrated in the court's statement that, "[w]e do not decide the
case in which a nursing home gave notice of its policy not to par-
ticipate in the withdrawal of artificial feeding at the time of a pa-
tient's admission. Thus we do not hold that such a policy is never
enforceable." 9' Accordingly, the decision of the Jobes' court is
consistent with that of Requena in recognizing a hospital's right to
adhere to such a policy subject to a requirement that hospitals pro-
vide proper notice to the patient.
It should be noted that, in a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Hern
implicitly accepted the existence of a countervailing state interest
that should in all instances take priority over a patient's right to
self-determination. Justice O'Hern found "it difficult to under-
stand how one can order nursing professionals with an abiding re-
spect for their patients to cease to furnish the most basic of human
needs to a patient in their care. "92 However, he immediately tem-
pered that assertion with the tantalizing suggestion that, presuma-
bly, because the patient has not explicitly issued an advance
directive, the physician is entitled to make a determination of the
86. Id. (suggesting that upon proper notice to the patient of a hospital's policy
against withholding life sustaining treatment the court might balance the equities in
favor of the hospital).
87. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987).
88. Compare id. at 438, with Requena, 517 A.2d at 888.
89. See Jobes, 529 A.2d at 450 (finding that "[t]he evidence indicates that at this
point it would be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to find another facility that
would accept Mrs. Jobes as a patient.").
90. Id. at 451.
91. Id. at 450.
92. Id. at 464 (O'Hearn, J., dissenting).
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patient's interests on the basis of her own value judgment.93 Of
course, the majority adopted a doctrine of substituted judgment
rather than a best interest standard.
The position of the New Jersey Supreme Court as enunciated in
Jobes was adopted by the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Rhode Island in Gray v. Romeo.94 The health care profes-
sionals associated with Rhode Island Medical Center were
"unanimous in their adamant opposition to the [removal of] nutri-
tion and hydration" from Mrs. Gray.95 These individuals opposed
such action for various reasons. They regarded such removal as
"tantamount to euthanasia, inconsistent with the physician's role as
safekeeper of his or her patient's [well-being]," and they were con-
cerned for the reputation of the hospital.96
The district court found that Mrs. Gray had a constitutional right
to forego artificial nutrition and hydration. In addition, the court,
citing Jobes as precedent, held that "Marcia Gray and her family
had no reason to believe that they were giving up her right to de-
termine her course of care by entering the Rhode Island Medical
Center." '97 Accordingly, the court ruled that Rhode Island Medical
Center must "accede to her request" unless she could be "promptly
transferred to a health care facility that would respect her
wishes. "98
Moreover, the district court's decision in Gray is significant for
an entirely different reason. Unlike the argument presented in
Jobes, the healthcare facility in Gray raised a religious objection
that the court seriously entertained.99 Although the court's formu-
lation of the argument can be hardly described as a model of clar-
ity, it apparently distinguishes between providing unwanted care by
means of initiation of an act of bodily intrusion and mere'failure to
93. Id. (O'Hearn, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern stated, "I do not believe that
such an order is essential to the Court's decision, and it may impinge upon the privacy
rights of those nursing professionals .... [This] is a case in which the health care
providers firmly believe the treatment is adverse.to the patient." Id. (O'Hearn, J.,
dissenting).
94. 697 F. Supp. 580, 585 (D.R.I. 1988).
95. Id. at 583.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 590.
98. Id. at 591 (noting that unless she could be promptly transferred the hospital
would have to respect her wishes).
99. Id. at 590 (stating that if 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1994) applies, then "a person associ-
ated with a health care facility may refuse on moral or religious grounds to participate
in an abortion or sterilization procedure," but holding that this did not apply because
the health care facility in question was not funded by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
withdraw a foreign object already in place. 100 If so, the underlying
assumption must be that refusal to allow the introduction of nutri-
ents and liquids into the feeding tube is not constitutionally pro-
tected, but that refusal of the tube itself is protected. Such a
distinction would be consistent with the care the court exercises in
an earlier section of its decision to categorize use of a gastrointesti-
nal tube as a medical procedure entirely analogous to use of a res-
pirator.101 The Gray court would apparently refuse to recognize a
constitutional right enabling even a patient in extremis, but capable
of normal ingestion of food, to commit suicide by starvation.10 2
Thus, it reasons that, although a patient may make medical deci-
sions affecting himself free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion, "the government is under no constitutional obligation to
provide resources to enable an individual to take full advantage of
his or her rights. 10 3
Thus, absent legislation, a physician has no obligation to assist a
patient in asserting her right to have the feeding tube removed.
The court then proceeds to note that Rhode Island legislation ex-
plicitly guarantees a patient the right to refuse medical care, which
the Court impliedly assumes includes the right to forego use of an
existing feeding tube to provide life-sustaining nutrition and hydra-
tion.10 4 The right to refuse delivery of certified nutrients through
an existing feeding tube is apparently regarded as suicide, and is
not constitutionally protected, but at least in Rhode Island, the
right to such refusal is guaranteed by statute.
In that context, the court proceeded to address the religious ob-
jection, not from the perspective of a Free Exercise claim, but from
the vantage point of Rhode Island statutory law. 5 The defendant
argued that the principle reflected in Rhode Island General Laws
section 23-17-11 (1985), which states that a person associated with
100. See id. (asserting that "the Constitution rarely commands an affirmative obli-
gation on the government's part.").
101. Id. at 587 (finding that "if a person has the right to decline life on a respira-
tor," then a person has the equal right to decline a gastrostomy tube) (citations
omitted).
102. Id. at 589 (noting the "distinction between deliberately ending a life by artifi-
cial means and allowing nature to take its course") (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 590 (citing Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1990)) (holding that
freedom from government interference in abortion decisions does not include the fa-
cilitation of funds necessary to exercise that right)).
104. Id. (stating that Rhode Island legislation guarantees a patient the right to re-
fuse medical care).
105. Id. (dismissing the constitutional argument in favor of a statutory and Canon
law approach).
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a health care facility may refuse on moral or religious grounds to
participate in an abortion procedure, should apply for withdrawal
of treatment as well. °6 The extension of that statutory provision to
withdrawal of a feeding tube is summarily dismissed by the court
on the grounds that the "statute is clearly limited to procedures
involving abortion and sterilization [and as such] does not apply to
the circumstances of this action."'0 7 Fair enough-at least insofar
as disposition of the case before the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island is concerned.
Nevertheless, the district court has provided a mechanism for as-
suring that religious objection to withdrawal of treatment will be
honored. The legislature of any state may simply enact legislation
to that effect.1"8 Since the court declared that, had notice been
given of the hospital's policy prior to the admission of Mrs. Gray to
that facility, the court would not have ordered withdrawal of the
feeding tube, the purpose of such legislation would be to obviate
the need for explicit notice. 10 9 It may also be presumed that such
legislation would create a right of refusal affecting even already
admitted patients. Since, according to the Gray court, the govern-
ment has no constitutional obligation to assist the patient in assert-
ing a right to have the tube removed, all peripheral issues are
subject to statutory regulation. 110
At present, Indiana's Health Code, Title 16, Article 36, chapter
4, section 13, provides that, "[i]f the attending physician, after rea-
sonable investigation, finds no other physician willing to honor the
patient's declaration, the attending physician may refuse to with-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (noting that the Rhode Island legislature enacted similar legislation with
respect to abortions and sterilization procedures; specifically the right of health care
facilities to refuse to participate on mutual or religious grounds).
109. See id. at 590-91.
110. Indeed, in a footnote the court refers to the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 300a-
7(d) (1994), which provides that:
[N]o individual shall be required to perform or assist in the performance of
any part of a health service program ... funded in whole or in part under a
program administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if his
performance or assistance in the performance of such part of such program
would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.
Id. at 590 n.6 (emphasis ommited). The court found that provision inapplicable be-
cause Marcia Gray was not receiving treatment through a federally funded health
service program or in conjunction with a federally funded research activity. Id. The
court thus acknowledged that, when treatment is provided in connection with such
federally funded programs or activities, such a statutory right does indeed exist. Id.
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hold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures." '111 In light of ex-
isting federal case law, assertion of a right of refusal to withhold
life-prolonging procedures in the sense of refusal to withhold a res-
pirator, or refusal to refrain from insertion of a feeding tube, is of
dubious constitutional validity (unless, as will be noted later, the
patient had been given prior notice). However, refusal to with-
draw a respirator or a feeding tube seems to be fully consistent
with the decision issued in Gray."2
Despite the federal district court's endorsement of the doctrine
formulated in Jobes, at least one New York court has ruled that a
medical facility has no duty to participate in the removal of a feed-
ing tube in violation of its medical-ethical judgment despite the ap-
parent absence of prior notice of such a policy. However, in that
case, Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., the court did rule
that the medical facility might be required to permit a physician
retained by the patient or by the patient's family to enter its prem-
ises in order to remove the tube.' 3 In an earlier related action, the
court in Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum declared that,
"[t]here never has been a court order issued in this State com-
manding a particular physician to do an act which is directly con-
trary to the physician's own medical ethics."" 4 In the latter
decision, the court found that "[a] patient who wishes to abstain
from life-saving medical treatment may haye the right to do so, but
he has no right to force a physician to assist, actively or passively,
in what the physician himself might regard as the equivalent of sui-
cide." 5 In addition, they unequivocally declared, "we do not rec-.
ognize any right to force a health provider to render treatment
which is contrary to his or her own conscience." ' 16
Medical institutions or individual physicians who, for reasons of
conscience, do not wish to withdraw a ventilator, nutrition, or hy-
dration from a patient in situations where such withdrawal would
otherwise be required by law would be well advised to make sure
that patients are informed of such a policy. Although the matter is
111. IND. CODE § 1-36-4-13 (1993).
112. See supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text. The Indiana statute does not
require that the physician's referral be predicated upon religious or moral grounds.
IND. CODE § 1-36-4-13. Based on the analysis presented herein no such claim should
be required in order to protect the statute from constitutional challenge.
113. Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 848 (App. Div.
1989).
114. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 859 (App. Div.
1992).
115. Id. at 858.
116. Id. at 859.
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not explicitly addressed in Gray, such notice should logically estab-
lish a physician's right not only to refuse to remove a ventilator or
feeding tube, but even to introduce such life-preserving mecha-
nisms contrary to the wishes of the patient. Of course, the patient
retains the right to seek transfer to another facility; thereby, termi-
nating her contract with the physician. The patient may also ac-
complish the same end by seeking the ministration of another
physician within the same facility, but prior notice would then have
the effect of protecting the new physician for the duration of the
existence of a contractual relationship. Although the patient has a
constitutionally protected right to refuse treatment, agreement to
be treated pursuant to such notice would constitute a waiver of that
right, and perhaps even a contractual undertaking to permit the
physician to fulfill her perceived duty to treat even in such
circumstances.
Jobes and Gray certainly serve as precedents for protection of
the moral integrity of a physician who cannot in good conscience
accede to the wishes of her patient. Nevertheless, in Childs v.
Abramovice, despite its incorporation of a reference to Gray, the
California Appellate Court remarked that, "[the] issue of whether
a court could compel physicians to act contrary to their ethical
views is too profound for gratuitous discussion in a dictum. Its res-
olution must await an appropriate case. ' 117
Legislative action would certainly be beneficial in removing lin-
gering legal doubt and in reassuring conflicted physicians. Moreo-
ver, legislation would afford an opportunity either to enshrine a
notice requirement or, alternatively, to adopt the policy enunciated
by the Grace Plaza court and reflected in the Indiana statute, and
to accord a physician greater protection by omitting such a
requirement.
117. Childs v. Abramovice, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 312 (1988).
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